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Introduction 
There has been for too long now a compelling case for reducing global carbon emissions at 
scale and at speed. The evidence continues to stack up of the need for urgent and serious 
mitigation, including already experienced climatic shifts that point towards the more extreme 
end of the range of climate model expectations. The IPCC 5th Assessment and its clear call 
for a carbon budget that keeps us below 2°C global average temperature rise, implies 
‘profound and immediate changes to the consumption and production of energy’ (Anderson 
2015: 898). Agreement, at the Paris climate summit, to a goal of limiting temperature rises to 
only 1.5°C implies even more profound changes. But, as climate justice arguments also 
make absolutely clear, these have to be made in ways that are not blind either to patterns of 
responsibility for climate change, or to the social and geographical distribution of the 
consequences and implications that follow.   





In this think piece, informed by various strands of collaborative work in the DEMAND Centre 
(www.demand.ac.uk) over the past 3 years, I argue that the combined need to reduce 
carbon emissions at scale, at speed, and in ways that embody fairness and justice, means 
that particularly in the more wealthy parts of the developed, carbon-saturated Global North, 
we have to both de-carbonise the energy supply system and de-energise the conduct of 
everyday life, at home, at work and in moving around. The notion of de-energising means 
radically reducing how much technologically produced energy is used and consumed to 
sustain the shared social practices that make-up accepted and normalised ways of living and 
being (Shove and Walker 2014); and, as I will outline, achieving this through forms of 
change and intervention that go well beyond seeking improvements just in technical energy 
efficiency.   
An underpinning principle for this line of thinking is to make energy do work where it is really 
needed.  Energy is defined by physicists as the ‘ability to do work’ but in the face of carbon 
and other limits we need to properly consider what work really needs to be done by 
technologically produced energy, and what can be achieved through other means and in 
other ways. These are not simple questions to resolve, but we are at a time when focusing 
on ‘what energy is for’ (the mantra of the DEMAND Centre) has to be a crucial part of both 
tackling energy poverty and properly addressing climate change in a socially just way.  
Why de-carbonising is not enough  
Before tackling these questions, a first step is to dismiss the seduction of only needing to 
pursue de-carbonisation. Make energy production low carbon, the seduction goes, and we 
can then use as much of it as we want. The examples of the few countries that have 
seemingly all but achieved this nirvana, makes it seem all the more possible. Iceland, for 
instance, is already in the virtuous position of generating all of its electricity through low 
carbon means (hydro and geothermal) and having 90% of its homes geothermally heated. 
Hence, its electricity and heating system carbon emissions have plummeted since the 1970s 
as coal-fired power generation has been removed. Transport fuels are still heavily carbon-
based and combined with mega-scale aluminium production this mean that, in per capita 
terms, total carbon emissions are not as low as imagined. However, Iceland today 
represents a way of thinking about an energy future that strips carbon out of supply to the 
extent that energy use appears unproblematic - geothermally sourced water in an outdoor 
hot tub carries little judgement, guilt or carbon cost. So why shouldn’t we all head towards 
this goal, meaning that we don’t have to worry about how energy is being demanded and 
consumed?     
First and most evident as a basic problem is the slow speed at which de-carbonising supply 
has progressed to-date and is likely to in the future. Anderson et al. (2015) stress this in 
making their case for prioritising demand reduction, arguing that just the long planning, 
construction and commissioning schedules for large scale energy supply infrastructures 
makes them inadequate to the challenge. Looking back to Iceland, its state-led 
transformation to low carbon electricity has been impressive in many ways, involving new 
innovations in high temperature geothermal exploitation, but this took over 40 years, in a 
country with a total population of only 330,000 and with plentiful available low carbon 
resources. The de-carbonisation challenge is so much more profound in the very many 
national and regional contexts in which there is a much higher existing aggregate level of 





current energy consumption and where alternatives to carbon lock-in within the energy 
system are much less immediately available. The rates at which small scale modular 
technologies – particularly solar power – are materialising and costs are falling are 
impressive, proving much more agile than traditional large scale investment trajectories. But 
on the other hand the rates of turnover and replacement of many energy using devices are 
relatively slow, so intended transformations in supply (e.g. from gas or petroleum to low 
carbon electricity) are likely to be held back by matching end use devices, such as electric 
vehicles or heating systems, not being in place at sufficient scale. Questions of achievable 
speed and trajectory are therefore difficult to be at all certain about, but what is more sure is 
that an energy supply system with much less recurrent energy demand to satisfy can only be 
easier and quicker to de-carbonise. Given also that carbon is a cumulative problem in which 
every tonne counts, staying within the 1.5°C temperature increase limit has to be very 
focused on the carbon produced in the short term here and now, not only the mid and longer 
term future.  
Second, and closely related are the cost implications and burdens of de-carbonisation that 
are both substantial in scale and that, without careful and progressive policy design, will 
have justice consequences for those already struggling to afford and/or access the energy 
needed to sustain their well-being. Whilst blaming renewable energy subsidies and similar 
interventions for energy price rises has been politically overblown, there are undoubtedly 
significant costs which have to be carried now and in the near future if decarbonisation of 
energy supply is to progress at pace. An estimate referred to in the most recent IPCC 
Assessment Report is 190-900 billion US Dollars additional investment in the energy supply 
sector globally, per year, to limit global temperature increase to below 2°C (IPCC 2014; 
552). During a period of austerity (enforced or chosen), governments have been unable or 
unwilling to source significant levels of public investment and, in the UK at least, there has 
been little appetite for supporting low carbon policy through socially progressive measures, 
rather than simply passing on costs to the consumer - including fuel poor ones. Longer-term 
costs are arguably so uncertain as to be essentially unknowable (Rosen and Guenther 
2015).  
Third, again for social justice reasons much of the investment now in low carbon 
technologies needs to be in Global South, addressing the ‘right to energy’ for much of the 
global population whose access to energy and affordability is insecure. I have argued 
elsewhere (Walker 2015) that the ‘right to energy’ whilst compelling in its simplicity, becomes 
far more involved in the working out of exactly what this means (what form of energy, how 
much, on what terms etc..) and that there is a danger of the space for political work that this 
opens up being co-opted by those wanting to roll out further forms of big centralised carbon-
based energy infrastructure into ‘new markets’. Far better for new infrastructures to ‘jump 
over’ the carbon-era and into local distributed networks and low carbon technologies. What 
can be achieved in improving well-being from a single solar panel in a village in rural Africa 
or India, is so much more than using the panel (along with many others) as part of 
decarbonising an ongoing energy profligate way of living in a village in leafy Surrey.  
Fourth, it would be naive to approach low carbon technologies energy supply as 
resoundingly virtuous, without recognising the problematic impacts and injustices they can 
generate. This is most clearly the case with nuclear power, which in the UK and other 
countries is presented as a key part of de-carbonising supply, with little proper recognition of 





the appallingly unresolved matter of how to deal with radioactive wastes, let alone the many 
other forms of risk and injustice that the industry presents along its geographically extended 
‘fuel cycle’ (Butler and Simmons 2013).  In Iceland, hydro-power might provide low carbon 
electricity, but its expansion in sensitive highland areas in order to power aluminium 
production has been deeply controversial (Benediktsson 2007, Saethorsdottir and Saarinen 
2016). As Newell and Mulvaney (2013) argue, so called ‘clean technologies’ should not be 
presented as ‘homogenously green’, pointing to environmental and justice issues with the 
production of solar PV and biofuels as two further examples. Wind, also, has not proved 
environmentally unproblematic. Editing out some low carbon technologies because of their 
wider implications, or at least using them sparingly and cautiously, evidently serves to put 
more pressure on points one to three above.  
The work that (produced) energy really needs to do  
So only aiming at rapidly de-carbonising supply is insufficient and problematic on justice 
grounds. What is simultaneously needed is a serious and systematic focus on de-energising 
– without diminishing the complexities that will also involve. A key way of approaching what 
de-energising entails is to focus on the work that technologically produced and supplied 
energy really needs to do. To focus on this is in contrast to either assuming that all energy 
demand is necessary and given; or that how energy is used and the work that it does is 
unchangeable. It is also different to thinking about demand reduction only in terms of 
increasing energy efficiency (more on that below). Before getting into some specifics in the 
next section, it is useful to outline some of the more general directions that including the 
notion of ‘really needs to do’ takes us in. Three are discussed here, recognising that there 
are others that could be pursued.   
(i) Energy use and the baseline of well-being – one direction involves concentrating 
directly on the notion of ‘need’ and to ask how energy use contributes to the basics of 
well-being and human flourishing. Clearly if energy use is to be substantially cut back 
(including in ways that protect the needs of the most vulnerable) we would need to 
have sense of where a ‘baseline’ of energy use might need to be - or at least a way 
of trying to work that out. With colleagues in the DEMAND Centre, we have 
approached this question in different ways. One was to look to theory and specifically 
the ‘capabilities approach’, which we have recently argued (Day, Walker et al. 2016) 
provides the most well founded, coherent and generally applicable way of 
conceptualising domestic energy use in relation to the outcomes that are derived and 
how these matter to well-being. Focusing on capabilities – what people are able to do 
or be – makes it possible to ask questions about both how and why energy use 
matters, and as we argue to also to look ‘for alternative means to support 
capabilities, that do not necessitate a specific energy service at a household level’ 
(ibid p262) which might include forms of sharing and collective provision.1 It also 
provides a flexible approach to defining what a ‘right to energy’ (see earlier 
                                               
1 For fuller discussion of the opportunities provided by sharing models, see Julian Agyeman and 
colleagues’ think-piece for Big Ideas at 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/agyeman_sharing_cities.pdf  





discussion) might need to mean - in outcome terms - in different contexts around the 
world.2  
An alternative more grounded approach to finding a baseline is to look to evidence of 
public deliberation about what forms of energy use are seen to really matter. In our 
work we did this by turning to the stream of ‘Minimum Income Standards’ (MIS) 
research outputs, produced by a team at Loughborough University for the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (Davis et al., 2014). Over the last eight years, this research 
has used a consensual, deliberative approach to ascertaining the goods and services 
that members of the public consider to be the basic necessities that everyone in the 
UK should be able to afford and have present in their everyday lives. We used this 
data to identify which energy using technologies and services are implicated in 
shared expectations of a minimally decent living standard, and also the reasoned 
grounds on which these judgements are being made (Walker, Simcock et al. 2016). 
This showed the diverse and multiple ways that energy use is part of a minimally 
decent way of life, and how this had shifted even over an 8 year period, with 
computers for example becoming seen as increasingly essential energy using items. 
Such evidence raises dilemmas though. On the one hand it provides a deliberative 
basis for defining what a profile of minimum energy uses might be (in the UK) and 
therefore what at least part of the work that energy ‘really needs to do’ might be. On 
the other it shows how new energy-using expectations are continually being made, 
how wants become needs and what is ‘normal’ is always on the move, through sets 
of interweaving processes of social and cultural change.3 The ‘minimum’ it follows is 
not fixed and can extend or diminish in the future, and challenging the movement of 
what becomes normal might therefore be warranted. On a third interpretation, 
however, it shows how much higher than the minimum the profile of everyday energy 
use is for many people in the UK, and therefore the substantial ‘headroom’ there is, a 
least in principle, for making significant reductions within this without cutting into 
baseline levels of well-being.   
(ii) Energy use and natural energy flows – moving in a rather different direction is to 
consider the relationship between technologically produced flows of energy (that 
currently predominantly involve the production of carbon) and those that flow through 
‘natural’ (although modified by man-made climate change) processes - therefore light 
and heat in particular. Some at least of the history of the extension of energy use has 
been to extend, supplement or modify natural energy flows – extending light into the 
dark evening, warming up already cold air in the winter, cooling already hot air in the 
summer. Part of the future of de-energising needs to be about reconfiguring these 
relationships, making our relationship with natural energy flows less dependent on 
technologically produced ones (a rather perverse arrangement), and in this way 
                                               
2 Whilst this work focused on household energy, colleagues in DEMAND have also used related 
thinking and ideas to consider conceptually what ‘need’ means in relation to transport and mobility 
(Mullen and Marsden 2015, Mattioli 2016). See also Caroline Mullen’s think-piece for Big Ideas 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/transport-freedom-movement-fairness-102382.pdf   
3 Victoria Hurth and colleagues discuss how genuinely responsible marketing might work to redefine 
and reshape needs to support sustainability in their think-piece for Big Ideas. Available at: 
https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/reforming-marketing-sustainability-full-report-
76676.pdf  





‘making (produced) energy do work where it is really needed’. There are many 
possible dimensions and strategies. One obvious one is the established but often 
neglected or badly done skill of building design, in which natural forms of lighting, air 
flow, ventilation and heating are maximised and energy using ones dispensed with. 
Allied to this are shared expectations of what internal environmental conditions will 
be, and enabling a greater breadth of normal room temperatures in particular, 
resisting the spreading standardisation of 21oC around the world (Shove, Walker et 
al. 2014). This means tackling the network of professional norms, product designs 
and clothing cultures that serve to make one temperature the apparently desired 
norm and expectation.    
Following a different line is to focus on the rhythmic interrelations between natural 
energy flows, what is done when and the temporal organisation of society (Walker 
2014). One macro-scale question, discussed further below, is how clock time and 
solar time are related, through both the setting of time-zones and seasonal clock-
shifting. Another is the way that the timing of potentially energy-using activities are 
organised, such that natural flows are accessed. A simple example is drying clothes 
through sun and wind, rather than by tumble drying, but there are many others 
including relating to how opening/start and closing/finishing hours of a host of 
activities are set and how activities are matched to seasonal climatic variations rather 
than in defiance of them. Extend ‘natural’ flows of energy into that which is 
metabolised through bodies and their muscles and we are into the merits of mobility 
through walking and cycling, and matching social rhythms to those of both the 
climate and the body. In these are other instances, justice considerations mean that 
we need to be aware of how issues of inequality and difference are potentially 
implicated (e.g. in relation to gendered patterns of doing housework) and develop 
means of addressing these.    
These are in many ways familiar observations and assertions, with equally familiar 
objections to why they are problematic to materialise in practice; and, as noted, also 
with potential inequality and injustice problems to grapple with. But the climate-
related demand for de-energising seriously and at scale makes them opportunities 
that need to be rediscovered and reinvigorated in how their materialisation is 
imagined and steered.     
(iii) Energy use and its ‘efficiency’ – it is commonplace for ‘energy demand reduction’ to 
be seen as synonymous with acting on energy inefficiency, and getting technologies 
to do their ‘work’ with only the energy consumption that is really needed, is patently 
sensible. Some significant gains have undoubtedly been achieved through improving 
technical energy efficiencies and there is potential to still be realised. Brenda 
Boardman (2014), for example, lays out the significant impact on total and peak 
electricity demand there has been and will be from converting the UK light bulb stock 
to progressively more efficient forms. However, the contribution of efficiency to de-
energising is constrained and there are substantial critiques of approach and 
outcome (Diamond and Shove 2015). Lutzenheiser (2014), for example, 
characterises the ‘energy efficiency industry’ as working within the frame of a 
‘physical-technical-economic model’ which focuses almost exclusively on technical 
devices and costs, and sees consumers as economic actors who are calculative, 





rational and conscious of the purposes of their use of energy. This adds up to an 
‘energy efficiency wonderland’ (ibid: 148), he argues, that promises much, but is 
constantly undermined by the simplicity of its underlying assumptions and crucially 
the fact that social change is continually at work around it. Hence individual light 
bulbs might be more efficient, but we now have many more of them integrated into 
normal home, shop and office designs than ever before, offsetting to some degree 
the efficiency gains that were theoretically available.  This is a more serious and 
pervasive problem than the economic rebound effect alone (Sorrell, 2007). Moreover 
in justice terms it is often the case that efficiency gains are materialised through more 
expensive forms of technology and economic mechanisms, such as the hopelessly 
ineffective ‘Green Deal’ in the UK, that have little relevance or impact on the situation 
of those already struggling to afford access to energy. Efficiency therefore has a role, 
but is not of itself, or in the ways it is typically pursued, sufficient to the task of 
achieving rapid de-energisation in ways that are fair and just.    
Making de-energisation a priority 
So to recap, there are clear arguments for pursuing de-energisation alongside de-
carbonisation, and starting with the principle of ‘making energy do work where it is really 
needed’ provides a number of different directions for approaching and conceiving of energy 
demand reductions as part of a low carbon and low energy transition that recognises its 
necessary justice dimensions. Turning these ‘directions’ into an active and fully engaged 
policy environment in which de-energising matters to political priorities and that has some 
prospect of working, at scale and at speed, is not at all straightforward.  In the UK we are a 
very long way from that position currently, and working out how to get there and what it 
would mean in detail and in practice remains very much a work in progress. There are some 
contexts internationally in which at least substantial ambitions for demand reduction are 
making more headway. For example, the German Energiewende includes a raft of targets 
for reducing energy demand, including overall primary energy demand falling by 20% by 
2020 compared to 2008, and by 50% by 2050. Demand-side action, for example on housing 
retrofits, has already achieved significant gains (McLaren 2014) with substantial financing 
delivered through state and local banks, but there are competing views on the rate of 
progress, some positive and arguing that targets could even be exceeded (Lovins 2013) and 
others more critical and guarded (Heymann 2016).  
Looking ahead though it is reasonable to suppose that at some future point there could be 
crises or problems that emerge for which serious or even radical de-energising becomes 
prioritised as part of a necessary response. An overt climate-induced crisis maybe, one that 
finally asserts the need for more radical mitigation action; or a systemic failure of the 
electricity system burdened with ever more escalating peak demand as heat and mobility 
become electrified in the pursuit of low carbon solutions. ‘Saving electricity in a hurry’ is 
already the title of guidance produced by the International Energy Agency for national 
governments faced with unexpected supply crises (IEA 2011), but as yet this is not imagined 
as applying beyond enabling a temporary response that bridges over a return to normal 
service.    
Future crises might not be so readily ‘bounced back’ from and arguing now for de-energising 
and filling out its possibilities is both a way of potentially avoiding damaging system crises in 





the first place, and being prepared for intervention once energy and climate politics do shift 
away from their supply-dominated heartlands.  There are three key high level and related 
targets in this respect on which work needs to be developed and sustained. 
Re-framing energy demand in public discourse - one of the most basic problems of 
making demand reduction matter politically is the way in which energy demand is talked 
about in public discourse. Recurrently there are associations made between growing 
demand being a sign of strength and progress, and the converse to have lower demand 
being a sign of weakness. To quote a recent discussion in the Economist (2016) ‘for now, 
the strain on the grid is lightened by feeble electricity demand in Britain, which is still more 
than 10% below its level before the financial crisis in 2008-09’.  As in this extract, there is 
also a recurrent assumption that demand will grow in the future (still below its past level, but 
not for long), and that this will be both inevitable and an indicator of success. Such a 
rationale has been closely mirrored in recent justifications for major energy policy decisions. 
For example, in giving approval to the new Hinkley point nuclear power station the need to 
meet rising demand was recurrently referred to in government statements, despite the fact 
that UK energy demand has been steadily falling since 2005 (DfBIES 2016) and is projected 
to continue on that trend.  
In analysis we undertook in the DEMAND Centre on how the media connected energy to 
languages of need and necessity, we also found a recurrent connection made between 
demand and need; in simple terms energy demand now and in the future is what is needed 
and what is needed has to be supplied; non-negotiable. Energy security it follows can only 
be about ensuring supply, not reducing demand.  Any attempt by those in government or in 
the energy industry to suggest that reducing demand might be a good thing, was 
immediately also cast in news reporting as a threat to fuel poor households, who were 
already not able to stay warm in their own homes.  
In combination this means there is little discursive space currently for demand reduction to 
be seen in a positive political light.  That space needs to be made, contested and filled out in 
new terms, so that ‘need’ can be questioned and debated rather than assumed, high levels 
of energy demand seen as a problem rather than a virtue, demand reduction recast as a 
positive rather than a weakness, and interventions to that end seen as sensible and 
necessary rather than radical and fanciful. The justice case for de-energisation can also be a 
positive dimension of such a reframing.      
Making demand reduction really the top of the energy hierarchy – there have been a 
number of attempts to bring the notion of a hierarchy into the energy world, mimicking that of 
the waste hierarchy which has been influential in shaping priorities in waste management 
policy.  The idea is that the hierarchy guides or specifies what ‘solution’ or action should be 
looked to first, before the next step in the hierarchy is enacted and so on. So in waste 
‘prevention’ comes first before ‘re-use’, ‘recycling’, ‘other recovery’ and ‘disposal’ in order of 
priority.  How effective the waste hierarchy is in practice is much debated, but through its 
prominence and embedding in regulation it at least makes waste prevention visible and 
legitimately arguable for across many different waste management settings.  For energy a 
properly constituted and legislatively embedded hierarchy could do similar work, with, for 
example, ‘avoiding energy use’ positioned at the top, followed by ‘minimising energy use’, 
and only then ‘maximising energy efficiency’, ‘using renewable low carbon energy’, ‘shifting 





energy use out of peak periods’ and other categories. There is little formal recognition of an 
energy hierarchy currently in policy, and those that are applied are constrained in how they 
see the top level – for example the Greater London Authority (2015) works with a simple ‘be 
lean, be clean, be green’ structure, and a version produced by the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers (2009) begins with ‘energy conservation’ understood in very conventional terms 
as the ‘reduction or elimination of unnecessary energy use and waste’. Opening up the top 
steps of a policy-embedded hierarchy to a much fuller and substantial set of demand 
reduction principles and properly filling out what these mean – including questioning the 
basics of what counts as needed energy and implications for inequality and vulnerability - 
could give de-energisation a significant impetus and practical foundation. Financing and 
properly incentivising action at the top of the hierarchy would then need to follow.4   
Bringing energy demand reduction into non-energy policy – a key limitation of the 
energy hierarchy though, is that it is positioned essentially in an energy policy world, 
concerned first and foremost with managing energy. However, just as preventing waste 
includes intervening in processes that are beyond the domain of those who deal with waste 
directly, avoiding and minimising energy use rapidly extends to processes that are about the 
ongoing making and constitution of energy demand across society. A major stream of work 
in the DEMAND Centre is focusing on the ‘invisible’ consequences of policies (see 
http://www.demand.ac.uk/influencing-demand/#invisible) across multiple domains – such as 
health, education, defence, planning, welfare and employment - that are directly implicated 
in making and shaping energy demand. De-energising at speed and scale therefore means 
developing forms of intervention that can steer the dynamics of everyday life and multiple 
social, business and institutional phenomena in lower energy directions - including in relation 
to their timings and rhythms, relationships to natural energy flows, embedding in conventions 
and standards, reliance on technologies and much else that has been touched on in this 
discussion.   
De-carbonising the energy system is vital, but, I have argued, not enough on its own or 
sufficient to realise a just and fair energy transition. De-energising has an equally important 
part to play, working in concert with stripping carbon out of energy supply, but extending its 
reach far beyond improving technical energy efficiency.  Making energy (only) do work 
where it is really needed, re-framing demand in public discourse, putting demand reduction 
at the top of an energy policy hierarchy and extending the reach of demand reduction policy 
beyond just the energy domain are all key moves for taking de-energisation forward in a fair 





                                               
4 For a fuller discussion of the challenges and opportunities for redirecting financing to support 
sustainability see Dave Powell’s article for Big Ideas at: https://www.foe.co.uk/page/transforming-
finance-do-we-need-rewild-finance-system  
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